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Abstract. Approximate Membership Query structures (AMQs) rely on
randomisation for time- and space-efficiency, while introducing a possi-
bility of false positive and false negative answers. Correctness proofs of
such structures involve subtle reasoning about bounds on probabilities
of getting certain outcomes. Because of these subtleties, a number of
unsound arguments in such proofs have been made over the years.
In this work, we address the challenge of building rigorous and reusable
computer-assisted proofs about probabilistic specifications of AMQs. We
describe the framework for systematic decomposition of AMQs and their
properties into a series of interfaces and reusable components. We imple-
ment our framework as a library in the Coq proof assistant and showcase
it by encoding in it a number of non-trivial AMQs, such as Bloom filters,
counting filters, quotient filters and blocked constructions, and mecha-
nising the proofs of their probabilistic specifications.
We demonstrate how AMQs encoded in our framework guarantee the
absence of false negatives by construction. We also show how the proofs
about probabilities of false positives for complex AMQs can be obtained
by means of verified reduction to the implementations of their simpler
counterparts. Finally, we provide a library of domain-specific theorems
and tactics that allow a high degree of automation in probabilistic proofs.
1 Introduction
Approximate Membership Query structures (AMQs) are probabilistic data struc-
tures that compactly implement (multi-)sets via hashing. They are a popular
alternative to traditional collections in algorithms whose utility is not affected
by some fraction of wrong answers to membership queries. Typical examples of
such data structures are Bloom filters [6], quotient filters [5, 37], and count-min
sketches [12]. In particular, versions of Bloom filters find many applications in
security and privacy [16,18,35], static program analysis [36], databases [17], web
search [22], suggestion systems [44], and blockchain protocols [19,42].
Hashing-based AMQs achieve efficiency by means of losing precision when
answering queries about membership of certain elements. Luckily, most of the
applications listed above can tolerate some loss of precision. For instance, a static
points-to analysis may consider two memory locations as aliases even if they are
not (a false positive), still remaining sound. However, it would be unsound for
such an analysis to claim that two locations do not alias in the case they do (a
false negative). Even if it increases the number of false positives, a randomised
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data structure can be used to answer aliasing queries in a sound way—as long
as it does not have false negatives [36]. But how much precision would be lost if,
e.g., a Bloom filter with certain parameters is chosen to answer these queries?
Another example, in which quantitative properties of false positives are critical,
is the security of Bitcoins Nakamoto consensus [34] that depends on the counts
of block production per unit time [19].
In the light of the described above applications, of particular interest are two
kinds of properties specifying the behaviour of AMQs:
– No-False-Negatives properties, stating that a set-membership query for an
element x always returns true if x is, in fact, in the set represented by the AMQ.
– Properties quantifying the rate of False Positives by providing a probabilistic
bound on getting a wrong “yes”-answer to a membership query, given certain
parameters of the data structure and the past history of its usage.
Given the importance of such claims for practical applications, it is desirable
to have machine-checked formal proofs of their validity. And, since many of the
existing AMQs share a common design structure, one may expect that a large
portion of those validity proofs can be reused across different implementations.
Computer-assisted reasoning about the absence of false negatives in a par-
ticular AMQ (Bloom filter) has been addressed to some extent in the past [7].
However, to the best of our knowledge, mechanised proofs of probabilistic bounds
on the rates of false positives did not extend to such structures. Furthermore, to
the best of our knowledge, no other existing AMQs have been formally verified
to date, and no attempts were made towards characterising the commonalities
in their implementations in order to allow efficient proof reuse.
In this work, we aim to advance the state of the art in machine-checked proofs
of probabilistic theorems about false positives in randomised hash-based data
structures. As recent history demonstrates, when done in a “paper-and-pencil”
way, such proofs may contain subtle mistakes [8, 10] due to misinterpreted as-
sumptions about relations between certain kinds of events. These mistakes are
not surprising, as the proofs often need to perform a number complicated manip-
ulations with expressions that capture probabilities of certain events. Our goal
is to factor out these reasoning patterns into a standalone library of reusable
program- and specification-level definitions and theorems, implemented in a
proof assistant enabling computer-aided verification of a variety of AMQs.
Our contributions. The key novel observation we make in this work is the decom-
position of the common AMQ implementations into the following components:
(a) a hashing strategy and (b) a state component that operates over hash out-
comes, together capturing most AMQs that provide fixed constant-time insertion
and query operations. Any AMQ that is implemented as an instance of those
components enjoys the no-false-negatives property by construction. Furthermore,
such a decomposition streamlines the proofs of structure-specific bounds on false
positive rates, while allowing for proof reuse for complex AMQ implementations,
which are built on top of simpler AMQs [39]. Powered by those insights, this work
makes the following technical contributions:
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– A Coq-based mechanised framework Ceramist, specialised for reasoning about
AMQs.3 Implemented as a Coq library, it provides a systematic decomposi-
tion of AMQs and their properties in terms of Coq modules and uses these
interfaces to to derive certain properties “for free”, as well as supporting proof-
by-reduction arguments between classes of similar AMQs.
– A library of non-trivial theorems for expressing closed-form probabilities on
false positive rates in AMQs. In particular, we provide the first mechanised
proof of the closed form for Stirling numbers of the second kind [25, Chapter 6].
– A collection of proven facts and tactics for effective construction of proofs
of probabilistic properties. Our approach adopts the style of Ssreflect reason-
ing [21,30], and expresses its core lemmas in terms of rewrites and evaluation.
– A number of case study AMQs mechanised via Ceramist: ordinary [6] and
counting [45] Bloom filters, quotient filters [5, 37], and Blocked AMQs [39].
For ordinary Bloom filters, we provide the first mechanised proof that the prob-
ability of a false positive in a Bloom filter can be written as a closed form
expression in terms of the input parameters; a bound that has often been mis-
characterised in the past due to oversight of subtle dependencies between the
components of the structure [6, 33]. For Counting Bloom filters, we provide the
first mechanised proofs of several of their properties: that they have no false neg-
atives, its false positive rate, that an element can be removed without affecting
queries for other elements, and the fact that Counting Bloom filters preserve the
number of inserted elements irrespective of the randomness of the hash outputs.
For quotient filters, we provide a mechanised proof of the false positive rate and
of the absence of false negatives. Finally, alongside the standard Blocked Bloom
filter [39], we derive two novel AMQ data structures: Counting Blocked Bloom
filters and Blocked Quotient filters, and prove corresponding no-false-negatives
and false positive rates for all of them. Our case studies illustrate that Ceramist
can be repurposed to verify hash-based AMQ structures, including entirely new
ones that have not been described in the literature, but rather have been ob-
tained by composing existing AMQs via the “blocked” construction.
Our mechanised development [24] is entirely axiom-free, and is compatible
with Coq 8.11.0 [11] and MathComp 1.10 [30]. It relies on the infotheo library [2]
for encoding discrete probabilities.
Paper outline. We start by providing the intuition on Bloom filters, our main
motivating example, in Sec. 2. We proceed by explaining the encoding of their
semantics, auxiliary hash-based structures, and key properties in Coq in Sec. 3.
Sec. 4 generalises that encoding to a general AMQ interface, and provides an
overview of Ceramist, its embedding into Coq, showcasing it by another example
instance—Counting Bloom filters. Sec. 5 describes the specific techniques that
help to structure our mechanised proofs. In Sec. 6, we report on the evaluation of
Ceramist on various case studies, explaining in detail our compositional treatment
of blocked AMQs and their properties. Sec. 7 provides a discussion on the state
of the art in reasoning about probabilistic data structures.
3 Ceramist stands for Certified Approximate Membership Structures.
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2 Motivating Example
Ceramist is a library specialised for reasoning about AMQ data structures in
which the underlying randomness arises from the interaction of one or more
hashing operations. To motivate this development, we thus consider applying it
to the classical example of such an algorithm—a Bloom filter [6].
2.1 The Basics of Bloom Filters
Bloom filters are probabilistic data structures that provide compact encodings of
mathematical sets, trading increased space efficiency for a weaker membership
test [6]. Specifically, when testing membership for a value not in the Bloom
filter, there is a possibility that the query may be answered as positive. Thus
a property of direct practical importance is the exact probability of this event,
and how it is influenced by the other parameters of the implementation.
b5 b6 … bmb4b2 b3b1
fkf2 …f1
xA Bloom filter bf is implemented as abinary vector of m bits (all initially zeros),
paired with a sequence of k hash functions
f1, . . . , fk, collectively mapping each in-
put value to a vector of k indices from
{1 . . .m}, the indices determine the bits
set to true in the m-bit array Assuming an
ideal selection of hash functions, we can
treat the output of f1, . . . , fk on new val-
ues as a uniformly-drawn random vector.
To insert a value x into the Bloom filter, we can treat each element of the “hash
vector” produced from f1, . . . , fk as an index into bf and set the corresponding
bits to ones. Similarly, to test membership for an element x, we can check that
all k bits specified by the hash-vector are raised.
2.2 Properties of Bloom Filters
Given this model, there are two obvious properties of practical importance: that
of false positives and of false negatives.
False Negatives. It turns out that these definitions are sufficient to guarantee the
lack of false-negatives with complete certainty, i.e., irrespective of the random
outcome of the hash functions. This follows from the fact that once a bit is
raised, there are no permitted operations that will unset it.
Theorem 1 (No False Negatives). If x ∈ bf , then Pr [x ∈? bf ] = 1, where
x ∈? bf stands for the approximate membership test, while the relation x ∈ bf
means that x has been previously inserted into bf .
False Positives. This property is more complex as the occurrence of a false pos-
itive is entirely dependent on the particular outcomes of the hash functions
f1, . . . , fk and one needs to consider situations in which the hash functions hap-
pen to map some values to overlapping sets of indices. That is, after inserting a
series of values xs, subsequent queries for y /∈ xs might incorrectly return true.
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This leads to subtle dependencies that can invalidate the analysis, and have
lead to a number of incorrect probabilistic bounds on the event, including in the
analysis by Bloom in his original paper [6]. Specifically, Bloom first considered
the probability that inserting l distinct items into the Bloom filter will set a
particular bit bi. From the independence of the hash functions, he was able to
show that the probability of this event has a simple closed-form representation:
Lemma 1 (Probability of a single bit being set). If the only values pre-
viously inserted into bf are x1, . . . , xl, then the probability of a particular single
bit at the position i being set is Pr
[
ith bit in bf is set
]
= 1− (1− 1m)kl .
Bloom then claimed that the probability of a false positive was simply the prob-
ability of a single bit being set, raised to the power of k, reasoning that a false
positive for an element y 6∈ bf only occurs when all the k bits corresponding to
the hash outputs are set.
Unfortunately, as was later pointed out by Bose et al. [8], as the bits specified
by f1(x), . . . , fk−1(x) may overlap, we cannot guarantee the independence that
is required for any simple relation between the probabilities. Bose et al. rectified
the analysis by instead interpreting the bits within a Bloom filter as maintaining
a set bits(bf ) ⊆ N[0,...,m−1], corresponding to the indices of raised bits. With
this interpretation, an element y only tests positive if the random set of indices
produced by the hash functions on y is such that inds(y) ⊆ bits(bf ). Therefore,
the chance of a positive result for y 6∈ bf resolves to the chance that the random
set of indices from hashing y is a subset of the union of inds(x) for each x ∈ bf .
The probability of this reduced event is described by the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Probability of False Positives). If the only values inserted into
bf are x1, . . . , xl, then for any y 6∈ bf , Pr [y ∈? bf ] = 1mk(l+1)
∑m
i=1 i
ki!
(
m
i
){
kl
i
}
,
where
{
s
t
}
stands for the Stirling number of the second kind, capturing the num-
ber of surjections from a set of size s to a set of size t.
The key step in capturing these program properties is in treating the outcomes
of hashes as random variables and then propagating this randomness to the
results of the other operations. A formal treatment of program outcomes requires
a suitable semantics, representing programs as distributions of such random
variables. In moving to mechanised proofs, we must first fully characterise this
semantics, formally defining a notion of a probabilistic computation in Coq.
3 Encoding AMQs in Coq
To introduce our encoding of AMQs and their probabilistic behaviours in Coq,
we continue with our running example, transitioning from mathematical notation
to Gallina, Coq’s language. The rest of this section will introduce each of the
key components of this encoding through the lens of Bloom filters.
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3.1 Probability Monad
Our formalisation represents probabilistic computations using an embedding fol-
lowing the style of the FCF library [38]. We do not use FCF directly, due to its pri-
mary focus on cryptographic proofs, wherein it provides little support for proving
probabilistic bounds directly, instead prioritising a reduction-based approach of
expressing arbitrary computations as compositions of known distributions.
Following the adopted FCF notation, a term of type Comp A represents a prob-
abilistic computation returning a value of type A, and is constructed using the
standard monadic operators, with an additional primitive rand n that allows
sampling from a uniform distribution over the range Zn:
ret : A→ Comp A
bind : Comp A→ (A→ Comp B)→ Comp B
rand : (n : N)→ Comp (Zn)
We implement a Haskell-style do-notation over this monad to allow descriptions
of probabilistic computations within Gallina. For example, the following code is
used to implement the query operation for the Bloom filter:
hash_res <-$ hash_vec_int x hashes; (* hash x using the hash functions *)
let (new_hashes, hash_vec) := hash_res in
(* check if all the corresponding bits are set *)
let qres := bf_query_int hash_vec bf in
(* return the query result and the new hashes *)
ret (new_hashes, qres).
In the above listing, we pass the queried value x along with the hash functions
hashes to a probabilistic hashing operation hash_vec_int to hash x over each
function in hashes. The result of this random operation is then bound to hash_res
and split into its constituent components—a sequence of hash outputs hash_vec
and an updated copy new_hashes of the hash functions, now incorporating the
mapping for x. Then, having mapped our input into a sequence of indices, we
can query the Bloom filter for membership using a corresponding deterministic
operation bf_query_int to check that all the bits specified by hash_vec are set.
Finally, we complete the computation by returning the query outcome qres and
the updated hash functions new_hashes using the ret operation to lift our result
to a probabilistic outcome.
Using the code snippet above, we can define the query operation bf_query
as a function that maps a Bloom filter, a value to query, and a collection of
hash functions to a probabilistic computation returning the query result and
an updated set of hash functions. However, because our computation type does
not impose any particular semantics, this result only encodes the syntax of the
probabilistic query and has no actual meaning without a separate interpretation.
Thus, given a Gallina term of type Comp A, we must first evaluate it into a
distribution over possible results to state properties on the probabilities of its
outcomes. We interpret our monadic encoding in terms of Ramsey’s probability
monad [41], which decomposes a complex distribution into composition of prim-
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itive ones bound together via conditional distributions. To capture this inter-
pretation within Coq, we then use the encoding of this monad from the infotheo
library [1,2], and provide a function eval_dist : Comp A→ dist A that evaluates
computations into distributions by recursively mapping them to the probability
monad. Here, dist A represents infotheo’s encoding of distributions over a finite
support A, defined as being composed of a measure function pmf : A→ R+, and
a proof that the sum of the measure over the support A produces 1.
This mapping from computations to distributions must be done to a program e
(involving, e.g., Bloom filter) before stating its probability bound. Therefore, we
hide this evaluation process behind a notation that allows stating probabilistic
properties in a form closer to their mathematical counterparts:
Pr [e = v] , (eval_dist e) v
Pr [e] , (eval_dist e) true
Above, v is an arbitrary element in the support of the distribution induced by
e. Finally, we introduce a binding operator B to allow concise representation of
dependent distributions: e B f , bind e f .
3.2 Representing Properties of Bloom Filters
We define the state of a Bloom filter (BF) in Coq as a binary vector of a fixed
length m, using Ssreflect’s m.-tuple data type:
Record BF := mkBF { bloomfilter_state: m.-tuple bool }.
Definition bf_new : BF := (* construct a BF with all bits cleared *).
Definition bf_get_int i : BF → bool := (* retrieve BF’s ith bit *).
We define the deterministic components of the Bloom filter implementation as
pure functions taking an instance of BF and a series of indices assumed to be
obtained from earlier calls to the associated hash functions:
bf_add_int : BF→ seq Zm → BF
bf_query_int : BF→ seq Zm → bool
That is, bf_add_int takes the Bloom filter state and a sequence of indices to
insert and returns a new state with the requested bits also set. Conversely,
bf_query_int returns true iff all the queried indices are set. These pure oper-
ations are then called within a probabilistic wrapper that handles hashing the
input and the book-keeping associated with hashing to provide the standard
interface for AMQs:
bf_add : B → (HashVec B ∗ BF)→ Comp (HashVec B ∗ BF)
bf_query : B → (HashVec B ∗ BF)→ Comp (HashVec B ∗ bool)
The component HashVec B (to be defined in Sec. 3.3), parameterised over an
input type B, keeps track of known results of the involved hash functions and is
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provided as an external parameter to the function rather than being a part of
the data structure to reflect typical uses of AMQs, wherein the hash operation
is pre-determined and shared by all instances.
With these definitions and notation, we can now state the main theorems of
interest about Bloom filters directly within Coq:4
Theorem 3 (No False Negatives). For any Bloom filter state bf , a vector of
hash functions hs, after having inserted an element x into bf , followed by a series
xs of other inserted elements, the result of query x ∈? bf is always true. That is,
in terms of probabilities: Pr [bf_add x (hs, bf ) B bf_addm xs B bf_query x] = 1.
Lemma 2 (Probability of Flipping a Single Bit). For a vector of hash func-
tions hs of length k, after inserting a series of l distinct values xs, all unseen in
hs, into an empty Bloom filter bf , represented by a vector of m bits, the proba-
bility of its any index i being set is Pr [bf_addm xs (hs, bf_new) B bf_get i] = 1−(
1− 1m
)kl
. Here, bf_get is a simple embedding of the pure function bf_get_int
into a probabilistic computation.
Theorem 4 (Probability of a False Positive). After having inserted a series
of l distinct values xs, all unseen in hs, into an empty Bloom filter bf , for any
unseen y 6∈ xs, the probability of a subsequent query y ∈? bf for y returning true is
given as Pr [bf_addm xs (hs, bf_new) B bf_query y] = 1
mk(l+1)
∑m
i=1 i
ki!
(
m
i
){
kl
i
}
.
The proof of this theorem required us to provide the first axiom-free mechanised
proof for the closed form for Stirling numbers of the second kind [25].
In the definitions above, we used the output of the hashing operation as the
bound between the deterministic and probabilistic components of the Bloom fil-
ter. For instance, in our earlier description of the Bloom filter query operation
in Sec. 3.1, we were able to implement the entire operation with the only prob-
abilistic operation being the call hash_vec_int x hashes. In general, structuring
AMQ operations as manipulations with hash outputs via pure deterministic
functions allows us to decompose reasoning about the data structure into a se-
ries of specialised properties about its deterministic primitives and a separate
set of reusable properties on its hash operations.
3.3 Reasoning about Hash Operations
We encode hash operations within our development using a random oracle-based
implementation. In particular, in order to keep track of seen hashes learnt by
hashing previously observed values, we represent a state of a hash function from
elements of type B to a range Zm using a finite map to ensure that previously
hashed values produce the same hash output:
Definition HashState B := FixedMap B ’I_m.
4 bf addm is a trivial generalisation of the insertion to multiple elements.
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The state is paired with a hash function generating uniformly random outputs
for unseen values, and otherwise returns the value as from its prior invocations:
Definition hash value state : Comp (HashState B * B) :=
match find value state with
| Some(output) ⇒ ret (state, output)
| None ⇒ rnd <-$ rand m;
new_state <- put value rnd state;
ret (new_state, rnd)
end.
A hash vector is a generalisation of this structure to represent a vector of states
of k independent hash functions:
Definition HashVec B := k.-tuple HashState B.
The corresponding hash operation over the hash vector, hash_vec_int, is then
defined as a function taking a value and the current hash vector and then return-
ing a pair of the updated hash vector and associated random vector, internally
calling out to hash to compute individual hash outputs.
This random oracle-based implementation allows us to formulate several helper
theorems for simplifying probabilistic computations using hashes by considering
whether the hashed values have been seen before or not. For example, if we knew
that a value x had not been seen before, we would know that the possibility
of obtaining any particular choice of a vector of indices would be equivalent to
obtaining the same vector by a draw from a corresponding uniform distribution.
We can formalise this intuition in the form of the following theorem:
Theorem 5 (Uniform Hash Output). For any two hash vectors hs, hs ′ of
length k, a value x that has not been hashed before, and an output vector ιs of
length m obtained by hashing x via hs, if the state of hs ′ has the same mappings
as hs and also maps x to ιs, the probability of obtaining the pair (hs ′, ιs) is
uniform: Pr
[
hash_vec_int x hs = (hs ′, ιs)
]
=
(
1
m
)k
Similarly, there are also often cases where we are hashing a value that we have
already seen. In these cases, if we know the exact indices a value hashes to, we
can prove a certainty on the value of the outcome:
Theorem 6 (Hash Consistency). For any hash vector hs, a value x, if hs
maps x to outputs ιs, then hashing x again will certainly produce ιs and not
change hs, that is, Pr [hash_vec_int x hs = (hs, ιs)] = 1.
By combining these types of probabilistic properties about hashes with the ear-
lier Bloom filter operations, we are able to prove the prior theorems about Bloom
filters by reasoning primarily about the core logical interactions of the determin-
istic components of the data structure. This decomposition is not just applicable
to the case of Bloom filters, but can be extended into a general framework for
obtaining modular proofs of AMQs, as we will show in the next section.
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4 Ceramist at Large
Zooming out from the previous discussion of Bloom filters, we now present Ce-
ramist in its full generality, describing the high-level design in terms of the various
interfaces it requires to instantiate to obtain verified AMQ implementations.
The core of our framework revolves around the decomposition of an AMQ
data structure into separate interfaces for hashing (AMQHash) and state (AMQ),
generalising the specific decomposition used for Bloom filters (hash vectors and
bit vectors respectively). More specifically, the AMQHash interface captures the
probabilistic properties of the hashing operation, while the AMQ interface cap-
tures the deterministic interactions of the state with the hash outcomes.
4.1 AMQHash Interface
The AMQHash interface generalises the behaviours of hash vectors (Sec. 3.3) to
provide a generic description of the hashing operation used in AMQs.
The interface first abstracts over the specific types used in the prior hashing
operations (such as, e.g., HashVec B) by treating them as opaque parameters: us-
ing a parameter AMQHashState to represent the state of the hash operation; types
Key and Value encoding the hash inputs and outputs respectively, and finally, a
deterministic operation AMQHash_add_internal : AMQHashState→ Key→ Value→
AMQHashState to encode the interaction of the state with the outputs and inputs.
For example, in the case of a single hash, the state parameter AMQHashState would
be HashState B, while for a hash vector this would instead be HashVec B.
To use this hash state in probabilistic computations, the interface assumes a
separate probabilistic operation that will take the hash state and randomly gen-
erate an output (e.g., hash for single hashes and hash_vec_int for hash vectors):
Parameter AMQHash_hash: Key → AMQHashState → Comp (AMQHash * Value).
Then, to abstractly capture the kinds of reasoning about the outcomes of
hash operations done with Bloom filters in Sec. 3.3, the interface assumes a few
predicates on the hash state to provide information about its contents:
Parameter AMQHash_hashstate_contains: AMQHashState → Key → Value → bool.
Parameter AMQHash_hashstate_unseen: AMQHashState → Key → bool.
These components are then combined together to produce more abstract for-
mulations of the previous Theorems 5 and 6 on hash operations.
Property 1 (Generalised Uniform Hash Output) There exists a probabil-
ity phash, such that for any two AMQ hash states hs, hs
′, a value x that is unseen,
and an output ιs obtained by hashing x via hs, if the state of hs ′ has the same
mappings as hs and also maps x to ιs, the probability of obtaining the pair (hs ′, ιs)
is given by: Pr
[
AMQHash_hash x hs = (hs ′, ιs)
]
= phash.
Property 2 (Generalised Hash Consistency) For any AMQ hash state hs,
a value x, if hs maps x to an output ιs, then hashing x again will certainly produce
ιs and not change hs: Pr [AMQhash_hash x hs = (hs, ιs)] = 1
Proofs of these corresponding properties must also be provided to instantiate
the AMQHash interface. Conversely, components operating over this interface
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can assume their existence, and use them to abstractly perform the same kinds
of simplifications as done with Bloom filters, resolving many probabilistic proofs
to dealing with deterministic properties on the AMQ states.
4.2 The AMQ Interface
Building on top of an abstract AMQHash component, the AMQ interface then
provides a unified view of the state of an AMQ and how it deterministically
interacts with the output type Value of a particular hashing operation.
As before, the interface begins by abstracting the specific types and operations
of the previous analysis of Bloom filters, first introducing a type AMQState to
capture the state of the AMQ, and then assuming deterministic implementations
of the typical add and query operations of an AMQ:
Parameter AMQ_add_internal: AMQState → Value → AMQState.
Parameter AMQ_query_internal: AMQState → Value → bool.
In the case of Bloom filters, these would be instantiated with the BF, bf_add_int
and bf_query_int operations respectively (cf. Sec. 3.2), thereby setting the as-
sociated hashing operation to the hash vector (Sec. 3.3).
As we move on to reason about the behaviours of these operations, the inter-
face diverges slightly from that of the Bloom filter by conditioning the behaviours
on the assumption that the state has sufficient capacity:
Parameter AMQ_available_capacity: AMQState → nat → bool.
While the Bloom filter has no real deterministic notion of a capacity, this cannot
be said of all AMQs in general, such as the Counting Bloom filter or Quotient
filter, as we will discuss later.
With these definitions in hand, the behaviours of the AMQ operations are
characterised using a series of associated assumptions:
Property 3 (AMQ insertion validity) For a state s with sufficient capacity,
inserting any hash output ιs into s via AMQ_add_internal will produce a new state
s′ for which any subsequent queries for ιs via AMQ_query_internal will return true.
Property 4 (AMQ query preservation) For any AMQ state s with suffi-
cient remaining capacity, if queries for a particular hash output ιs in s via
AMQ_query_internal happen to return true, then inserting any further outputs
ιs ′ into s will return a state for which queries for ιs will still return true.
Even though these assumptions seemingly place strict restrictions on the per-
mitted operations, we found that these properties are satisfied by most common
AMQ structures. One potential reason for this might be because they are in fact
sufficient to ensure the No-False-Negatives property standard of most AMQs:
Theorem 7 (Generalised No False Negatives). For any AMQ state s, a
corresponding hash state hs, after having inserted an element x into s, followed
by a series xs of other inserted elements, the result of query for x is always true.
That is, Pr [AMQ_add x (hs, s) B AMQ_addm xs B AMQ_query x] = 1.
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AMQ
AMQHash
Bloom Filter
Counting BF
Quotient FilterBlockedAMQ
Blocked Quotient FilterCounting Blocked BF
HashHash Vector Multiplexed Hash
AMQMap
Legend
Instantiates
Used as component
Used for reduction
AMQ Interface/partial impl.
Hash Implementation
Fig. 1: Overview of Ceramist and dependencies the between its components.
Here, AMQ_add, AMQ_addm, and AMQ_query are generalisations of the probabilistic
wrappers of Bloom filters (cf. Sec. 3.1) for doing the bookkeeping associated
with hashing and delegating to the internal deterministic operations.
The generalised Theorem 7 illustrates one of the key facilities of our frame-
work, wherein by simply providing components satisfying the AMQHash and
AMQ interfaces, it is possible to obtain proofs of certain standard probabilistic
properties or simplifications for free.
The diagram in Fig. 1 provides a high-level overview of the interfaces of Ce-
ramist, their specific instances, and dependencies between them, demonstrating
Ceramist’s take on compositional reasoning and proof reuse. For instance Bloom
filter implementation instantiates the AMQ interface implementation and uses,
as a component, hash vectors, which themselves instantiate AMQHash used by
AMQ. Bloom filter itself is also used as a proof reduction target by Counting
Bloom filter. We will elaborate on this and the other noteworthy dependencies
between interfaces and instances of Ceramist in the following sections.
4.3 Counting Bloom Filters through Ceramist
To provide a concrete demonstration of the use of the AMQ interface, we now
switch over to a new running example—Counting Bloom filters [45]. A Counting
Bloom filter is a variant of the Bloom filter in which individual bits are replaced
with counters, thereby allowing the removal of elements. The implementation of
the structure closely follows the Bloom filter, generalising the logic from bits to
counters: insertion increments the counters specified by the hash outputs, while
queries treat counters as set if greater than 0. In the remainder of this section, we
will show how to encode and verify the Counting Bloom filter for the standard
AMQ properties. We have also proven two novel domain-specific properties of
Counting Bloom filters, which, due to space limits, we outline in Appendix A.
First, as the Counting Bloom filter uses the same hashing strategy as the
Bloom filter, the hash interface can be instantiated with the Hash Vector struc-
ture used for the Bloom filter, entirely reusing the earlier proofs on hash vectors.
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Next, in order to instantiate the AMQ interface, the state parameter can be
defined as a vector of bounded integers, all initially set to 0:
Record CF := mkCF { countingbloomfilter_state: m.-tuple Zp }.
Definition cf_new : CF := (* a new CF with all counters set to 0 *).
As mentioned before, the add operation increments counters rather than set-
ting bits, and the query operation treats counters greater than 0 as raised.
cf_add_int : CF→ seq Zm → CF
cf_query_int : CF→ seq Zm → bool
To prevent integer overflows, the counters in the Counting Bloom filter are
bounded to some range Zp, so the overall data structure too has a maximum
capacity. It would not be possible to insert any values if doing such would
raise any of the counters above their maximum. To account for this, the ca-
pacity parameter of the AMQ interface is instantiated with a simple predicate
cf_available_capacity that verifies that the structure can support l further in-
serts by ensuring that each counter has at least k ∗ l spaces free (where k is the
number of hash functions used by the data structure).
The add operation can be shown to be monotone on the value of any counter
when there is sufficient capacity (Property 3). The remaining properties of the
operations also trivially follow, thereby completing the instantiation, and allow-
ing the automatic derivation of the No-False-Negatives result via Theorem 7.
4.4 Proofs about False Positive Probabilities by Reduction
As the observable behaviour of Counting Bloom filter almost exactly matches
that of the Bloom filter, it seems reasonable that the same probabilistic bounds
should also apply to the data structure. To facilitate these proof arguments, we
provide the AMQMap interface that allows the derivation of probabilistic bounds
by reducing one AMQ data structure to another.
The AMQMap interface is parameterised by two AMQ data structures, AMQ
A and B, using the same hashing operation. It is assumed that corresponding
bounds on False Positive rates have already been proven for AMQ B, while have
not for AMQ A. The interface first assumes the existence of some mapping from
the state of AMQ A to AMQ B, which satisfies a number of properties:
Parameter AMQ_state_map: A.AMQState → B.AMQState.
In the case of our Counting Bloom filter example, this mapping would convert
the Counting Bloom filter state to a bit vector by mapping each counter to a
raised bit if its value is greater than 0. To provide the of the false positive rate
boundary, the AMQMap interface then requires the behaviour of this mapping
to satisfy a number of additional assumptions:
Property 5 (AMQ Mapping Add Commutativity) Adding a hash output
to the AMQ B obtained by applying the mapping to an instance of AMQ A
produces the same result as first adding a hash output to AMQ A and then
applying the mapping to the result.
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Property 6 (AMQ Mapping Query Preservation) Applying B’s query op-
eration to the result of mapping an instance of AMQ A produces the same result
as applying A’s query operation directly.
In the case of reducing Counting Bloom filters (A) to Bloom filters (B), both
results follow from the fact that after incrementing the some counters, all of
them will have values greater than 0 and thus be mapped to raised bits.
Having instantiated the AMQMap interface with the corresponding function
and proofs about it, it is now possible to derive the false positive rate of Bloom fil-
ters for Counting Bloom filters for free through the following generalised lemma:
Theorem 8 (AMQ False Positive Reduction). For any two AMQs A, B,
related by the AMQMap interface, if the false positive rate for B after inserting l
items is given by the function f on l, then the false positive rate for A is also
given by f on l. That is, in terms of probabilities:
Pr [B.AMQ_addm xs (hs, B.AMQ_new) B B.AMQ_query y] = f(length xs) =⇒
Pr [A.AMQ_addm xs (hs, A.AMQ_new) B A.AMQ_query y] = f(length xs).
5 Proof Automation for Probabilistic Sums
We have, until now, avoided discussing details of how facts about the probabilis-
tic computations can be composed, and thereby also the specifics of how our
proofs are structured. As it turns out, most of this process resolves to reasoning
about summations over real values as encoded by Ssreflect’s bigop library. Our
development also relies on the tactic library by Martin-Dorel and Soloviev [31].
In this section, we outline some of the most essential proof principles fa-
cilitating the proofs-by-rewriting about probabilistic sums. While most of the
provided rewriting primitives are standalone general equality facts, some of our
proof techniques are better understood as combining a series of rewritings into a
more general rewriting pattern. To delineate these two cases, will use the termi-
nology Pattern to refer to a general pattern our library supports by means of a
dedicated Coq tactic, while Lemma will refer to standalone proven equalities.
5.1 The Normal Form for Composed Probabilistic Computations
When stating properties on outcomes of a probabilistic computation (cf. Sec. 3.1),
the computation must first be recursively evaluated into a distribution, where the
intermediate results are combined using the probabilistic bind operator. There-
fore, when decomposing a probabilistic property into smaller subproofs, we must
rely on its semantics that is defined for discrete distributions as follows:
bind_dist (P : dist A) (f : A→ dist B) ,
∑
a: A
∑
b: B
P a × (f a) b
Expanding this definition, one can represent any statement on the outcome of a
probabilistic computation in a normal form composed of only nested summations
over a product of the probabilities of each intermediate computational step. This
paramount transformation is captured as the following pattern:
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Pattern 1 (Bind normalisation)
Pr [(c1 B . . . B cm) = v] =
∑
v1
· · ·
∑
vm−1
Pr [c1 = v1]× · · · × Pr [cm vm−1 = v]
Here, by ci vi−1 = vi, we denote the event in which the result of evaluating
the command ci vi−1 is vi, where vi−1 is the result of evaluating the previous
command in the chain. This transformation then allows us to resolve the proof
of a given probabilistic property into proving simpler statements on its substeps.
For instance, consider the implementation of Bloom filter’s query operation from
Section 3.1. When proving properties of the result of a particular query (as in
Theorem 3), we use this rule to decompose the program into its component parts,
namely as being the product of a hash invocation Pr [hash_vec_int x hs] and the
deterministic query operation bf_query_int. This allows dealing with the hash
operation and the deterministic component separately by applying subsequent
rewritings to each factor on the right-hand side of the above equality.
5.2 Probabilistic Summation Patterns
Having resolved a property into our normal form via a tactic implementing
Pattern 1, the subsequent reductions rely on the following patterns and lemmas.
Sequential composition. When reasoning about the properties of composite pro-
grams, it is common for some subprogram e to return a probabilistic result that
is then used as the arguments for a probabilistic function f . This composition
is encapsulated by the operation e B f , as used by Theorems 3, 2, and 4. The
corresponding programs, once converted to the normal form, are characterised
by having factors within its internal product that simply evaluate the probability
of the final statement ret v′ to produce a particular value vk:∑
v1
· · ·
∑
vm−1
Pr [c1 = v1]× · · ·Pr
[
ret v′ = vk
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
e
· · · × Pr [cm vm−1 = v]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f
Since the return operation is defined as a delta distribution with a peak at the
return value v′, we can simplify the statement by removing the summation over
vk, and replacing all occurrences of vk with v
′, via the following pattern:
Pattern 2 (Probability of a Sequential Composition)∑
v1
· · ·
∑
vm−1
Pr
[
ret v′ = v1
] · · · × Pr [cm vm−1 = v]] =
∑
v2
· · ·
∑
vm−1
Pr
[
[v′/v1](c2 v1) = v2
]× · · · × Pr [[v′/v1]cm vm−1 = v]
Notice that, without loss of generality, Pattern 2 assumes that the v′-containing
factor is in the head. Our tactic implicitly rewrites the statement to this form.
Plausible statement sequencing. One common issue with the normal form, is
that, as each statement is evaluated over the entirety of its support, some of
the dependencies between statements are obscured. That is, the outputs of one
statement may in fact be constrained to some subset of the complete support.
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To recover these dependencies, we provide the following theorem, that allows
reducing computations under the assumption that their inputs are plausible:
Lemma 3 (Plausible Sequencing). For any computation sequence c1 B c2,
if it is possible to reduce the computation c2 x to a simpler form c3 x when x is
amongst plausible outcomes of c1, ( i.e., Pr [c1 = x] 6= 0 holds) then it is possible
to rewrite c2 to c3 without changing the resulting distribution:∑
x
∑
y
Pr [c1 = x]× Pr [c2 x = y] =
∑
x
∑
y
Pr [c1 = x]× Pr [c3 x = y]
Plausible outcomes. As was demonstrated in the previous paragraph, it is some-
times possible to gain knowledge that a particular value v is a plausible outcome
for a composite probabilistic computation c1 B . . . B cm:∑
v1
· · ·
∑
vm−1
Pr [c1 = v1]× · · · × Pr [cm vm−1 = v] 6= 0
This fact in itself is not particularly helpful as it does not immediately provide
any usable constraints on the value v. However, we can now turn this inequality
into a conjunction of inequalities for individual probabilities, thus getting more
information about the intermediate steps of the computation:
Pattern 3 If
∑
v1
· · ·∑vm−1 Pr [c1 = v1] × · · · × Pr [cm vm−1 = v] 6= 0, then
there exist v1, . . . , vm−1 such that Pr [c1 = v1] 6= 0 ∧ · · · ∧ Pr [cm = v] 6= 0.
This transformation is possible due to the fact that probabilities are always non-
negative, thus if a summation is positive, there must exist at least one element
in the summation that is also positive.
Summary of the development. By composing these components together, we ob-
tain a comprehensive toolbox for effectively reasoning about probabilistic com-
putations. We find that our summation patterns end up encapsulating most of
the book-keeping associated with our encoding of probabilistic computations,
which, combined with the AMQ/AMQHash decomposition from Sec. 4, allows
for a fairly straightforward approach for verifying properties of AMQs.
5.3 A Simple Proof of Generalised No False Negatives Theorem
To showcase the fluid interaction of our proof principles in action, let us consider
the proof of the generalised No-False-Negatives Theorem 7, stating the following:
Pr
AMQ_add x (hs, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a),(b)
B AMQ_addm xs︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
B AMQ_query x︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d),(e)
 = 1 (1)
As with most of our probabilistic proofs, we begin by applying normalisation
Pattern 1 to reduce the computation into our normal form:
∑
ιs0,hs0
∑
s0
∑
s1,hs1
∑
ιs2,hs2

(a) Pr [AMQHash_hash x hs = (ιs0, hs0)] ×
(b) Pr [ret (AMQ_add_internal s ιs0) = s0] ×
(c) Pr [AMQ_addm xs (s0, hs0) = (s1, hs1)] ×
(d) Pr [AMQHash_hash x hs1 = (ιs2, hs2)] ×
(e) Pr [ret (AMQ_query_internal s1 ιs2)]

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We label the factors to be rewritten as (a)–(e) for the convenience of the presen-
tation, indicating the correspondence to the components of the statement (1).
From here, as all values are assumed to be unseen, we can use Property 1 in con-
junction with the sequencing Pattern 2 to reduce factors (a) and (b) as follows:
∑
ιs0
∑
s1,hs1
∑
ιs2,hs2

(a) phash ×
(c) Pr [AMQ_addm xs ((s←add ιs0), (hs ←hash (x : ιs0))) = (s1, hs1)] ×
(d) Pr [AMQHash_hash x hs1 = (ιs2, hs2)] ×
(e) Pr [AMQ_query_internal s1 ιs2]

Here, phash is the probability from the statement of Property 1. We also intro-
duce the notations s←add ιs0 and hs ←hash (x : ιs0) to denote the deterministic
operations AMQ_add_internal and AMQHash_add_internal respectively. Then, using
Pattern 3 for decomposing plausible outcomes, it is possible to separately show
that any plausible hs1 from AMQ_addm must map x to ιs0, as hash operations pre-
serve mappings. Combining this fact with Lemma 3 (plausible sequencing) and
Hash Consistency (Property 2), we can derive that the execution of AMQHash_hash
on x in (d) must return ιs0, simplifying the summation even further:
∑
ιs0
∑
s1,hs1
 (a) phash ×(c) Pr [AMQ_addm xs ((s←add ιs0), (hs ←hash (x : ιs0))) = (s1, hs1)] ×
(e) Pr [AMQ_query_internal s1 ιs0]

Finally, as s1 is a plausible outcome from AMQ_addm called on s ←add ιs0, we
can then show, using Property 4 (query preservation), that querying for ιs0 on
s1 must succeed. Therefore, the entire summation reduces to the summation of
distributions over their support, which can be trivially shown to be 1.
6 Overview of the Development and More Case Studies
Section Size (LOC)
Specifications Proofs
Bounded containers 286 1051
Notation (§3.1) 77 0
Summations (§5) 742 2122
Hash operations (§4.1) 201 568
AMQ framework (§4.2) 594 695
Bloom filter (§3.2) 322 1088
Counting BF (§4.4, §A) 312 674
Quotient filter (§6.1) 197 633
Blocked AMQ (§6.2) 269 522
The Ceramist mechanised framework is
implmented as library in Coq proof as-
sistant [24]. It consists of three main
sub-parts, each handling a different
aspect of constructing and reasoning
about AMQs: (i) a library of bounded-
length data structures, enhancing Math-
Comp’s [30] support for reasoning about
finite sequences with varying lengths;
(ii) a library of probabilistic computa-
tions, extending the infotheo probability
theory library [2] with definitions of deeply embedded probabilistic computations
and a collection of tactics and lemmas on summations described in Sec. 5; and
(iii) the AMQ interfaces and instances representing the core of our framework
described in Sec. 4.
Alongside these core components, we also include four specific case studies to
provide concrete examples of how the library can be used for practical verifica-
tion. Our first two case studies are the mechanisation of the Bloom filter [6] and
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the Counting Bloom filter [45], as discussed earlier. In proving the false-positive
rate for Bloom filters, we follow the proof by Bose et al. [8], also providing the
first mechanised proof of the closed expression for Stirling numbers of the second
kind. Our third case study provides mechanised verification of the quotient fil-
ter [5]. Our final case study is a mechanisation of the Blocked AMQ—a family of
AMQs with a common aggregation strategy. We instantiate this abstract struc-
ture with each of the prior AMQs, obtaining, among others, a mechanisation of
Blocked Bloom filters [39]. The sizes of each library component, along with the
references to the sections that describe them, are given in the table above.
Of particular note, in effect due to the extensive proof reuse supported by
Ceramist, the proof size for each of our case-studies progressively decreases, with
around a 50% reduction in the size from our initial proofs of Bloom filters to the
final case-studies of different Blocked AMQs instances.
6.1 Quotient Filter
A quotient filter [5] is a type of AMQ data structure optimised to be more cache-
friendly than other typical AMQs. In contrast to the relatively simple internal
vector-based states of the Bloom filters, a quotient filter works by internally
maintaining a hash table to track its elements.
The internal operations of a quotient filter build upon a fundamental notion
of quotienting, whereby a single p-bit hash outcome is split into two by treating
the upper q-bits (the quotient) and the lower r-bits (the remainder) separately.
Whenever an element is inserted or queried, the item is first hashed over a single
hash function and then the output quotiented. The operations of the quotient
filter then work by using the q-bit quotient to specify a bucket of the hash table,
and the r-bit remainder as a proxy for the element, such that a query for an
element will succeed if its remainder can be found in the corresponding bucket.
A false positive can occur if the outputs of the hash function happen to exactly
collide for two particular values (collisions in just the quotient or remainder are
not sufficient to produce an incorrect result). Therefore, it is then possible to
reduce the event of a false positive in a quotient filter to the event that at least
one in several draws from a uniform distribution produces a particular value.
We encode quotient filters by instantiating the AMQHash interface from Sec. 4.1
with a single hash function, rather than a vector of hash functions, which is
used by the Bloom filter variants (Sec. 2). The size of the output of this hashing
operation is defined to be 2q ∗ 2r, and a corresponding quotienting operation is
defined by taking the quotient and remainder from dividing the hash output by
2q. With this encoding, we are able to provide a mechanised proof of the false
positive rate for the quotient filter implemented using p-bit hash as being:
Theorem 9 (Quotient filter False Positive Rate). For a hash-function hs,
after inserting a series of l unseen distinct values xs into an empty quotient filter
qf , for any unseen y 6∈ xs, the probability of a query y ∈? qf for y returning true
is given by: Pr [qf_addm xs (hs, qf_new) B qf_query y] = 1− (1− 12p )l .
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6.2 Blocked AMQ
Blocked Bloom filters [39] are a cache-efficient variant of Bloom filters where a
single instance of the structure is composed of a vector of m independent Bloom
filters, using an additional “meta”-hash operation to distribute values between
the elements. When querying for a particular element, the meta-hash operation
would first be consulted to select a particular instance to delegate the query to.
While prior research has only focused on applying this blocking design to
Bloom filters, we found that this strategy is in fact generic over the choice of
AMQ, allowing us to formalise an abstract Blocked AMQ structure, and later
instantiate it for particular choices of “basic” AMQs. As such, this data structure
highlights the scalability of Ceramist wrt. composition of programs and proofs.
Our encoding of Blocked AMQs within Ceramist is done via means of two
higher-order modules as in Fig. 1: (i) a multiplexed-hash component, parame-
terised over an arbitrary hashing operation, and (ii) a blocked-state component,
parameterised over some instantiation of the AMQ interface. The multiplexed
hash captures the relation between the meta-hash and the hashing operations
of the basic AMQ, randomly multiplexing hashes to particular hashing opera-
tions of the sub-components. We construct a multiplexed-hash as a composition
of the hashing operation H used by the AMQ in each of the m blocks, and a
meta-hash function to distribute queries between the m blocks. The state of this
structure is defined as pairing of m states of the hashing operation H, one for
each of the m blocks of the AMQ, with the state of the meta-hash function. As
such, hashing a value v with this operation produces a pair of type (Zm, Value),
where the first element is obtained by hashing v over the meta-hash to select a
particular block, and the second element is produced by hashing v again over the
hash operation H for this selected block. With this custom hashing operation,
the state component of the Blocked AMQ is defined as sequence of m states of
the AMQ, one for each block. The insertion and query operations work on the
output of the multiplexed hash by using the first element to select a particular
element of the sequence, and then use the second element as the value to be
inserted into or queried on this selected state.
Having instantiated the data structure as described above, we proved the
following abstract result about the false positive rate for blocked AMQs:
Theorem 10 (Blocked AMQ False Positive Rate). For any AMQ A with
a false positive rate after inserting l elements estimated as f(l), for a multiplexed
hash-function hs, after having inserted l distinct values xs, all unseen in hs, into
an empty Blocked AMQ filter bf composed of m instances of A, for any unseen
y 6∈ xs, the probability of a subsequent query y ∈? bf for y returning true is given
by: Pr [BA_addm xs (hs, BA_new) B BA_query y] =
∑l
i=0
(
l
i
)
( 1m )
i(1− 1m )l−if(i).
We instantiated this interface with each of the previously defined AMQ struc-
tures, obtaining the Blocked Bloom filters, Counting Blocked Bloom filters and
Blocked Quotient filter along with proofs of similar properties for them, for free.
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7 Discussion and Related Work
Proofs about AMQs. While there has been a wealth of prior research into approx-
imate membership query structures and their probabilistic bounds, the preva-
lence of paper-and-pencil proofs has meant that errors in analysis have gone
unnoticed and propagated throughout the literature.
The most notable example is in Bloom’s original paper [6], wherein dependen-
cies between setting bits lead to an incorrect formulation of the bound (equation
(17)), which has since been repeated in several papers [9, 14, 15, 32] and even
textbooks [33]. While this error was later identified by Bose et al. [8], their own
analysis was also marred by an error in their definition of Stirling numbers of the
second kind, resulting in yet another incorrect bound, corrected two years later
by Christensen et al. [10], who avoided the error by eliding Stirling numbers alto-
gether, and deriving the bound directly. Furthermore, despite these corrections,
many subsequent papers [13,27–29,39,40,45] still use Bloom’s original incorrect
bounds. For example, in Putze et al. [39]’s analysis of a Blocked Bloom filter,
they derive an incorrect bound on the false positive rate by assuming that the
false positive of the constituent Bloom filters are given by Bloom’s bound.
Mechanically Verified Probabilistic Algorithms. Past research has also focused on
the verification of probabilistic algorithms, and our work builds on the results
and ideas from several of these developments.
The ALEA library also tackles the task of proving properties of probabilis-
tic algorithms [3]. In contrast to our choice of a deep embedding for encod-
ing probabilistic computations, ALEA uses a shallow embedding through a Giry
monad [20], representing probabilistic programs as measures over their outcomes.
As ALEA axiomatises a custom type to represent the subset of reals between 0
and 1 for capturing probabilities, they must independently prove any properties
on reals required for their theorems, considerably increasing the proof effort.
The Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF) [38] was developed for
proving the security properties of cryptographic programs and provides an en-
coding for probabilistic algorithms. Rather than developing specific tooling for
solving probabilistic obligations as we do, their library prioritises a proof strat-
egy of proving the probabilistic properties of computations by reducing them
to standard “difficult” programs with known distributions. While this strategy
closely follows the typical structure of cryptographic proofs, their simple encod-
ing increases the complexity of directly proving probabilistic properties.
Tassarotti et al.’s Polaris [46] library is a Coq framework for reasoning about
probabilistic concurrent algorithms. Polaris uses the same reduction strategy for
probabilistic specifications as the FCF library, inheriting some of the same issues
with proving standalone bounds.
Ho¨lzl considered mechanised verification of probabilistic programs in Isabelle/
HOL [26]. While Ho¨lzl uses a similar composition of probability and computa-
tion monads to encode and evaluate probabilistic programs, his construction
defines the semantics of programs as infinite Markov chains, represented as a
co-inductive stream of probabilistic outputs. This design makes the encoding
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unsuitable for capturing terminating programs, yet it is the only encoding we
are aware of that enables probabilistic proofs about non-terminating programs.
Our previous effort on mechanising the probabilistic properties of blockchains
also considered the encoding of probabilistic computations in Coq [23]. While
that work also relied on infotheo’s probability monad, it primarily considered
the mechanisation of a restricted form of probabilistic properties (those with
complete certainty), and did not deliver reusable tooling for this task.
While the Ceramist development is the first, to the best of our knowledge, that
provides a mechanised proof of the probabilistic properties of Bloom filters, prior
research has considered their deterministic properties. Blot et al. [7] provided a
mechanised proof of the absence of false negatives for their implementation of a
Bloom filter as part of their work on a library for using abstract sets to reason
about the bit-manipulations in low-level programs.
Proofs of differential privacy. A popular motivation for reasoning about proba-
bilistic computations is for the purposes of demonstrating differential privacy.
Barthe et al.’s CertiPriv framework [4] extends ALEA to support reasoning
using a Probabilistic Relational Hoare logic, and uses this fragment to prove
probabilistic non-interference arguments. However, CertiPriv focuses on proving
relational probabilistic properties of coupled computations rather than explicit
numerical bounds as we do. More recently, Barthe et al. [43] have developed a
mechanisation that supports a more general coupling between distributions. In
the future, we plan to employ Ceramist for extending the verification of AMQs
to infer the induced probabilistic bounds on differential privacy guarantees [16].
8 Conclusion
The key properties of Approximate Membership Query structures are inherently
probabilistic. Formalisations of those properties are frequently stated incorrectly,
due to the complexity of the underlying proofs. We have demonstrated the fea-
sibility of conducting such proofs in a machine-assisted framework. The main
ingredients of our approach are a principled decomposition of structure defini-
tions and proof automation for manipulating probabilistic sums. Together, they
enable scalable and reusable mechanised proofs about a wide range of AMQs.
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A Domain-Specific Properties of Counting Bloom Filters
While the No-False-Negatives and false positive rate properties are practically
important aspects of an AMQ, in the case of a Counting Bloom filter, there are
a few other probabilistic behaviours of the structure that are of importance. One
such property is the ability to remove some elements from a Counting Bloom
filter without affecting queries for other ones, by decrementing the counters
corresponding to the removed element.
To demonstrate the flexibility of our framework, we also provide a mecha-
nised proof of the validity of this removal operation, which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been previously formalised:
Theorem 11 (Counting Bloom filter removal). For any Counting Bloom
filter cf with sufficient capacity and associated hashes hs, removing a previously
inserted value x′ will not change the query for any other previously inserted value
x, that is: Pr [cf_add x′ (hs, cf) B cf_add x B cf_remove x′ B cf_query x] = 1.
The operation cf_remove from the theorem statement deletes a value from the
Counting Bloom filter by decrementing the associated counters, and is provided
as a custom operation externally to the other Ceramist components, as removal
operations are not a typical operation in AMQ interfaces.
Our development also provides a proof of another specialised property of the
structure—that inserting any value will increase the total sum of the counters
by a fixed amount. This property characterises how the modified state of the
Counting Bloom filter allows tracking more detailed information, than just ele-
ment membership, in terms of the exact number of insertions.
Theorem 12 (Certainty of Counter Increments). For any counting Bloom
filter cf , a value y that was not previously inserted into cf , if the sum of the values
of all counters di in cf is l, then after inserting y, the sum of the counters will
certainly increment by k, that is: Pr
[∑
di∈cf di = l + k
]
= 1.
